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Summary
Summary
This volume of Ned Block's writings collects his papers on consciousness, functionalism, and representationism. A number of these papers treat the significance of the multiple realizability of mental states for the mind-body problem--a theme that has concerned Block since the 1960s. One paper on this topic considers the upshot for the mind-body problem of the possibility of a robot that is functionally like us but physically different--as is Commander Data of Star Trek's second generation. The papers on consciousness treat such conceptual issues as phenomenal versus access consciousness, Dennett's theory of consciousness, and the function of consciousness, as well as such empirical matters as "How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness," and (in an expanded version of a paper originally in Trends in Cognitive Sciences ) an argument that there are distinct neural correlates for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. Turning to the mind-body problem, Block defends physicalism against Max Black's argument concerning phenomenal modes of presentation. The papers on representationism consider "mental paint" as well as the "Inverted Earth" thought experiment--a world in which colors are reversed but there is a compensating reversal in the words that are used to describe them.
Consciousness, Function, and Representation , bringing together papers that have appeared primarily in journals and conference proceedings, can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness.
Summary
«Quins valors queden quan totha estat destruït?»El 14 de juliol de 1099, mentre Jerusalem es prepara per resistir l'atac de la poderosa Croada, un filòsof grec anomenat Copte convoca joves i ancians, homes i dones a la plaça. El Copte no pretén donar instruccions sobre la defensa de la ciutat, ni adherir-se a cap religió, ni fundar-ne una de nova.El filòsof vol transmetre els millors ensenyaments que ha escoltat i que ha après durant la seva vida. «No ets derrotat quan perds, sinó quan desisteixes», els diu. La multitud vol saber quin és el veritable enemic, i pregunten al Copte sobre el sentit de la lluita, de les crisis i dels canvis, de la por, de la bellesa i del sexe... i, finalment, de la manera de reconèixer el propi camí.Mil anys després, les respostes del filòsof grec són ara més reveladores que mai.Veure vídeo de l'autor
Table of Contents
Introduction: Remarks on Chauvinism and the Mind-Body Problem | p. 1 |
I Functionalism | p. 13 |
1 Functionalism | p. 15 |
2 What Is Functionalism? | p. 27 |
3 What Psychological States Are Not, with J. Fodor | p. 45 |
4 Troubles with Functionalism | p. 63 |
5 What Intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Show | p. 103 |
II Concepts of Consciousness | p. 109 |
6 Consciousness | p. 111 |
7 Review of Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained | p. 129 |
8 What Is Dennett's Theory a Theory Of? | p. 141 |
9 On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness | p. 159 |
10 How Many Concepts of Consciousness? | p. 215 |
11 Biology versus Computation in the Study of Consciousness | p. 249 |
12 Ridiculing Social Constructivism about Phenomenal Consciousness | p. 269 |
13 Concepts of Consciousness | p. 275 |
III Empirical Approaches to Consciousness | p. 297 |
14 How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness | p. 299 |
15 Paradox and Cross-Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness | p. 311 |
16 Spatial Perception via Tactile Sensation | p. 339 |
17 Two Neural Correlates of Consciousness | p. 343 |
18 Review of Alva Noe, Action in Perception | p. 363 |
IV Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem | p. 377 |
19 Are Absent Qualia Impossible? | p. 379 |
20 The Harder Problem of Consciousness | p. 397 |
21 Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity | p. 435 |
V Consciousness and Representation | p. 499 |
22 Qualia | p. 501 |
23 Inverted Earth | p. 511 |
24 Mental Paint | p. 533 |
25 Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness | p. 571 |
26 Is Experiencing Just Representing? | p. 603 |
27 Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism | p. 611 |
Name Index | p. 617 |
Subject Index | p. 625 |