Moral philosophy as a theoretical discipline --
Theory as resistance and a 'testing of reality'; against practicism --
Naivety and reflection --
On the tension between theory and practice --
Spontaneity and resistance --
Hostility to moralities confined to particulars --
Ethics as bad conscience; on behalf of a morality bluntly incompatible with our experience --
'Morality and its Discontents' --
Problem of ethos and personality --
Ethical is no natural category --
Morality and social crisis --
Sociology of the repressive character --
General and the particular --
Lectures: attempts at critical models --
Dual nature of reason in Kant: theory and practice, epistemology and metaphysics --
On the theory of antinomies --
Distinction between scepticism and 'the sceptical method' --
Nature of the antinomies --
Causality and freedom; spontaneity --
Thesis of the third antinomy --
Motif of a causality born of freedom --
Principle of causality and the necessity of the antinomies --
Dialectics in Kant and Hegel --
Problem of the prima philosophia: the first cause --
Causality, law and freedom --
External nature of the concept of causality --
Summary: causality born of freedom --
Dual character of Kantian philosophy; the one and the many --
Once again: theory and practice --
On the Doctrine of Method: 1. The nature of reason --
3. Freedom and the domination of nature --
4. Disappointing of metaphysical expectations --
5. Rejection of philosophical indifference --
6. Idea of God and the rights of criticism --
7. Priority of practice --
Theory and practice of the 'Doctrine of Method' --
Form and content in practical philosophy --
Practice as the exclusion of experience; freedom as reason --
What is primary and what is secondary? The moral law as a given --
Can social contradictions be resolved? Bourgeois optimism --
Can the moral law be learnt through experience? --
Difficulty of distinguishing between a priori knowledge and knowledge from experience --
Necessity and universality; a 'second-order given' --
Coercive character of empirically given morality --
Psychoanalytical objection --
Return of teleology; the element of heteronomy --
Principle of exegesis; the 'extinction of intention' --
Dual character of nature --
Kant 'breaks off' the argument; Resistance to and acceptance of heteronomy --
Historical dialectics of morality; the 'growing old of morality' --
Intolerable dualism of freedom and law; The Protestant tradition --
Experience of spirit and nature as opposed to domination --
Methodological excursus: literal interpretation versus the history of ideas --
Kantian ethics is the moral philosophy par excellence --
Formalism and rigorism --
Grounding of morality in reason: Against 'the education of the heart' --
Element of non-identity; coercion by a third party --
Restricted nature of Kantian ethics; bourgeois calculus and bureaucratic virtue --
Ambivalence of the unmediated good --
Autonomy and heteronomy --
Absence of balance between freedom and law --
Formalism and social context --
Kant's writings on moral philosophy --
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals --
Excursus on phenomenology --
Psychological aspect: Good will and ill will --
Disappearance of freedom --
Transition to the problem of an ethics of responsibility and conviction --
Suppression of instinct as the general philosophical attitude --
Self-preservation and compensation --
Fetishization of renunciation --
Idea of humanity: a hypothesis --
Totalitarianism of ends --
Reason as an end in itself --
Kant's ethics of conviction [Gesinnung] --
War on two fronts: against empiricism and theology --
Difference from Plato: the idealism of reason --
Early bourgeois pathos and Rousseauism --
Interiority and the German misere --
Dialectical element of morality --
Excursus: Ibsen's The Wild Duck --
Conscience: 'can be very hard' --
Explication: entanglement in existing reality --
Critique of Hegel's sublation [Aufhebung] of morality --
Resistance to a false life --
Fallibility in the face of the masks of evil --
Contra Nietzsche's critique of morality --
Limits of morality as the crisis of individualism; transition from critique to political consciousness.
